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Abstract. The application of formal methods for rigorously validating crypto-
graphic protocols has been getting increasing attention. The de facto standard for
modeling such protocols in formal proof systems is the Dolev-Yao model that,
e.g., uses abstract encryption instead of cryptographic encryption primitives. The
Dolev-Yao model has been originally intended and successfully used for detect-
ing flaws in many protocols. However, recent publications claim to perform ac-
tual proofs of security using this model, i.e., absence of any attack. We doubt this
claim and challenge Dolev-Yao-based models as being oversimplified for estab-
lishing security proofs against arbitrary attacks.
We substantiate our claim by an example protocol. This protocol has been proven
secure in a Dolev-Yao-based model using formal methods. In a later publication,
the protocol has been broken by describing a cryptographic attack. The attack
was not detected in the formal analysis since any Dolev-Yao-based model only
comprises a predefined set of adversary capabilities. The particular attack to break
the protocol was not comprised.
The only reliable long-term remedy is to proof resilience against all attacks (both
known and unknown ones). Recent approaches on cryptographic models of se-
curity have already made great progress towards this goal. Unfortunately, proofs
in these are more complex and harder to automate. On the short run, it therefore
is appropriate to improve the quality of formal analysis without striving for com-
plete proofs. This can be achieved by means of evolving a catalog of adversary
capabilities. Future formal analysis can then show resilience against any attack
in this catalog. We initiate this discussion on an “adversary capability catalog”
by providing a cryptographer’s wish list. This list that points out several features
which approaches based on the Dolev-Yao model or future extensions of it should
cover in order to be effective for cryptographic protocol verification.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, cryptographic protocols are getting increasing attention in both the-
ory and practice. In the early days of security research, these protocols were
designed using a simple iterative process: someone proposed a protocol, some-
one else found an attack, the bug was fixed, and so on, until no further attack
was found. Today, it is commonly accepted that this “wait-and-fix” approach
requires a long time to become effective and hence does not provide much secu-
rity guarantee. As one of the most prominent examples, we name SSL, in which
subtle flaws were discovered even after years of using it, although its security
was well-evaluated.
The long-term goal for actual security proofs is to show absence of any
attack. This includes cryptographic as well as other attacks, based on known
as well as unknown adversary strategies. Unfortunately, such rigorous crypto-
graphic proofs covering the whole mathematical details rapidly become imprac-
tical if they go beyond the individual cryptographic primitives. They moreover
have to be done by hand and are hence prone to error. This motivated the use
of formal methods for the verification of cryptographic protocols, i.e., proto-
cols should be verified using model checkers or theorem provers. Since current
formal proof systems cannot deal with cryptographic details like probabilism,
computational restrictions such as polynomially bounded adversaries, and er-
ror probabilities, abstractions of cryptography are used instead. This yields the
well-known notion of perfect cryptography. As these abstractions originated
from the seminal work of Dolev and Yao [38], this approach is typically referred
to as the Dolev-Yao model. In Dolev-Yao-based models, the capabilities of an
adversary and the properties of the cryptographic primitives are described by
an initial set of rules. The attractiveness of this approach for detecting flaws in
security protocols is underlined by a large amount of work done by the formal-
methods community, cf. the related literature for a comprehensive overview. In
recent times however, there is a strong drift to use this model for establishing
proofs of security, i.e., results in Dolev-Yao-based models are interpreted in the
sense that no attack exists against the protocol.
We doubt this claim for two reasons. The first reason is that proofs rely on
the abstraction that every possible attack can can be derived from the initial
set of adversary capabilities, i.e., they assume some kind of completeness. The
problems arising here is that certain cryptographic attacks might have been ab-
stracted away, e.g., cryptographic computations that compute faked messages
[68, 64] for breaking a protocol. As a consequence, a system where the abstrac-
tion is replaced by an actual cryptographic primitive may be susceptible to at-
tacks that are undetectable in the analysis. One way to fix this it to change to
models based on cryptographic notions [34, 63, 65, 23, 21] of security, cf. the re-
lated literature. Unfortunately, proofs in these models are hard to automate. As
a consequence, we will not elaborate on this problem any further.
The second reason why Dolev-Yao-based analysis does not yield proofs is
that the Dolev-Yao approach explicitly models the attacker capabilities. I.e.,
each analysis only considers a given set of attack strategies instead of covering
all attacks. We will present one example of a “Dolev-Yao secure” yet vulnerable
protocol in detail. The reason why the Dolev-Yao analysis did not detect the vul-
nerability was that the adversary capability needed for breaking the system was
not foreseen and therefore not considered by the analysis. On the long run, this
will probably turn out to the use of models capturing the cryptographic notions
of security instead.
We believe that Dolev-Yao-based verification is very effective in proving
resilience against known adversary strategies. Therefore, we propose a “catalog
of adversary capabilities” as a shorter-term remedy. The goal of this paper is to
initiate an evolution of a catalog of attack strategies to be used for Dolev-Yao-
based verifications. Future enlargements of this catalog can then contribute to
higher the security assurance of Dolev-Yao-based analysis.
Loosely speaking, we propose to switch from protocol evolution using trial-
and-error to adversary strategy evolution.
1.1 Outline
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we briefly introduce the Dolev-
Yao-based models along with related work and the cryptographic justification of
the models. Moreover, we discuss several cryptographic approaches to protocol
verification, and we point out some recent models that are suited for capturing
the cryptographic details but nevertheless allow for formal verification. In the
future, these models may become alternatives to the Dolev-Yao-based models.
In Section 3 we describe a protocol of Karjoth et. al. [45] that has been proven
secure in a Dolev-Yao-based model using formal methods and afterwards has
been broken. The reason was that a particular adversary capability was not con-
sidered in the Dolev-Yao-based analysis. In Section 4 we initiate the discussion
on an “adversary capabilities catalog” by proposing a cryptographer’s wish list
that points out future research in Dolev-Yao models with the intention to take
the approach closer to the cryptographic reality. It mainly consists of additional
capabilities that should be granted to the adversary for reflecting cryptographic
possibilities, and of several attacks that should be detected by a formal analysis
in Dolev-Yao-based models.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Overview of the Dolev-Yao-based Models
The Dolev-Yao model has been introduced in [38]. It considers cryptographic
primitives as operators in a free algebra, and only allows the adversary to apply
certain predefined rules within the algebra. For instance, the set of messages
considered in the Dolev-Yao model could be given by
Messages := Atom | encrypt(Message,Key)
where Atom is some set of so-called atomic messages and Key ⊆ Atom are
those atoms used for encrypting and decrypting messages. For a key K , its in-
verse key is typically denoted by K−1.
In order to make formal verification feasible in models following this ap-
proach (Dolev-Yao-based models), the adversary is defined by a set of rules.
These rules determine which messages the adversary is allowed to know, i.e.,
which messages he is allowed to deduce and create based on an observed set
of messages B. The set B typically contains those messages that are sent be-
tween the participants of a protocol, i.e., the rules define which information the
adversary can learn by eavesdropping on the network.
The following rules represent the typical Dolev-Yao attacker for our set of
messages. We writeB ⊢M to denote that the adversary is allowed to deduce the
message M from B. At first, every message that the adversary has eavesdropped
can obviously be used, i.e.,
M ∈ B ⇒ B ⊢M. (1)
At second, if the adversary knows a message M and a key K , then he is allowed
to compute the encryption of M under K , i.e.,
B ⊢M ∧B ⊢ K ∧K ∈ Key ⇒ B ⊢ encrypt(M,K). (2)
Finally, the adversary can decrypt a ciphertext if he has the corresponding secret
key, i.e.,
B ⊢ encrypt(M,K) ∧B ⊢ K−1 ⇒ B ⊢M. (3)
Whenever the adversary eavesdrops a new message the set B is extended and
the adversary can use the above rules to deduce and create new messages again.
The adversary is restricted to sending only those messages that he has already
deduced, i.e., he is not allowed to, e.g., guess a message. The proof is then per-
formed by showing that the adversary cannot deduce a secret, e.g., a secret key.
Various proof tools can be used for this task, cf. the related literature. This ab-
straction simplifies proofs of larger protocols considerably. Note that we only
described a simple Dolev-Yao-based model here, which only covers encryp-
tion and decryption. Typically used Dolev-Yao-based models are more exten-
sive, i.e., they comprise operators for nonce generation, digital signatures, hash
functions, or message pairing and splitting. The overall proof technique is not
affected by these extensions.
Originally, formal methods used this approach to detect certain attacks in
protocols. As one of the most prominent examples, we point out the work of
Lowe [51], which used the model checker FDR to discover an attack against
the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol, which was widely believed to be
secure at this time. The goal of searching for common attacks is surely a worthy
one, as it helps to lift the protocol to a (much) higher level of security. Moreover,
an error found in Dolev-Yao-based models always yields an error in the actual
cryptographic implementation.
2.2 Prior Work in The Dolev-Yao model and its Cryptographic
Justification
Early work using Dolev-Yao-based models for tool-supported proofs was rather
specific with respect to the considered issue and formalism, e.g., [56, 52, 46].
More recently, research mainly focused on standard languages, state exploration
tools and theorem proving techniques, mainly initiated by the seminal work of
Lowe [51], where the general-purpose model checker FDR was used to find a
man-in-the-middle attack on the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol [58].
Work since then made progress in applying model checkers [57, 37] as well
as theorem provers [61, 39] for the verification of security protocols, and sev-
eral specialized model checkers have been developed. Besides investigating the
actual verification techniques, research also focused on standard languages for
expressing security protocols, e.g., the well-known spi-calculus by Adabi and
Gordon [1].
Since this whole line of work turned out to be very successful, the inter-
esting question arose whether these abstractions are indeed justified from the
view of cryptography, i.e., whether properties proved for the abstractions are
still valid for the cryptographic implementation.1 Abadi et. al. showed in [4, 2]
that the Dolev-Yao model is cryptographically faithful at least for symmetric en-
cryption and synchronous protocols. There, however, the adversary is restricted
to passive eavesdropping. Another interesting approach has been presented by
Guttman et. al. [41], which starts adapting the strand space theory [67] to con-
crete cryptographic primitives. More precisely, they show that the probability
of two executions of the same protocol – either executed in a Dolev-Yao-like
framework or using real cryptographic primitives – may deviate from each other
at most for a certain bound. However, their results are specific for the Wegman-
Carter system so far. Moreover, as this system is information-theoretically se-
cure, its security proof is much easier to handle than asymmetric primitives since
1 An initial comparison between Dolev-Yao and cryptographic notions of security can be found
in [62].
no reduction proofs against underlying number-theoretic assumptions have to be
made. Some further approaches for special security goals or primitives are [69,
48]. As of now (3,5 years after the original publication of the paper [27] that
underlies this report), a multitude of results related to computational soundness
have been achieved, see., e.g. [5, 19, 14, 18, 25, 22, 8, 15, 55, 17, 24, 11, 22, 15,
16, 9, 13, 10, 12], and our initial belief in [27] that some symbolic abstractions
cannot be proven computationally sound has been confirmed by now [16, 26].
2.3 Cryptographic Notions of Security
For living up to the probabilistic nature of cryptography, a framework for deal-
ing with actual cryptography necessarily has to be able to deal with probabilis-
tic behaviors, error probabilities and complexity-theoretically bounded adver-
saries. Based on these requirements, several general definitions of secure pro-
tocols were developed over the years, e.g. [40, 54, 28, 49, 63, 44, 33, 65, 34, 23],
which are all potential candidates for such a framework. For a comprehensive
analysis of security protocols, a suitable model should moreover capture a reac-
tive environment, i.e., continuous interaction with the users and the adversary.
Unfortunately, most of the above work does not live up to these requirements in
spite of its generality, mainly since it concentrates on the task of secure function
evaluation, which does not capture a reactive environment. Currently, the mod-
els of Backes, Pfitzmann et. al. [63, 65, 23] and Canetti [34], which have been
developed concurrently but independently, stand out as the standard models for
sound protocol analysis and design.
Their security definition is simulatability which captures the notion of a
cryptographically secure implementation. Simulatability bridges the gap be-
tween abstract specifications and cryptographic implementations, i.e., abstrac-
tions which can be shown to simulate a given implementation in a particular
sense are known to be sound with respect to the security definitions of cryp-
tography. Currently, such faithful abstractions have already been developed
for medium-sized examples comprising secure message transmission, certified
mail, or secure key exchange. Moreover, the recently published universally com-
posable cryptographic library [20, 18, 15, 25] may pave the way to formal verifi-
cation of large security protocols within these cryptographically faithful models.
3 A Formally Secure yet Vulnerable Protocol
In [45], Karjoth, Asokan, and Gu¨lcu¨ proposed four protocols which aim at pro-
tecting the computational results established by free-roaming mobile agents.
Roughly, a shopping agent is described that visits several shops and then col-
lects and compares offers for a specific good. One of the main goals to be estab-
lished is the integrity of offers, i.e., a malicious shop must not be able to modify
already existing offers. This property is called strong forward integrity. It is im-
portant to note that the authors mainly concentrated on motivating and defining
the actual protocols and only included brief sketches of the respective security
proofs. In the following, we concentrate on the first protocol, called P1 in [45].
In [29], the strong forward integrity property of P1 has been formally veri-
fied using the theorem prover Isabelle [59]. The protocol was as usual expressed
in the Dolev-Yao-based model, and the modeling and the proof were explained
in a detailed way. Very surprisingly in the context of this result, an attack on
P1 was found in [66] which violates the strong forward integrity property. Even
more surprisingly, this attack was not a “bit-twiddling” attack with only ques-
tionable use in practice, but the attack is very easy to accomplish and succeeds
with probability one. In the following, we sketch the protocol P1, its modeling
in the formal Dolev-Yao framework, the actual attack on the protocol, and we
finally analyze why this flaw has not been detected in this model.
3.1 Sketch of the Protocol
We start by introducing the necessary protocol notation. In the following, we
consider an originator S0, which sends its agent Π to n shops S1, . . . , Sn for
collecting their offers. The offer of Si is denoted as oi, the encapsulated offer is
denoted as Oi.
Let sigi(m) denote a digital signature created by Si for a message m and
enc0(m) a public-key encryption for m with the public key of S0. Let H be a
one-way collision-free hash function; ri are randomly chosen nonces of Si.
The protocol P1 is called the publicly verifiable chained digital signature
protocol, which is defined as follows:
– Encapsulated Offer:
• Oi = sigi(enc0(oi, ri), hi) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n
– Chaining Relation:
• h0 = H(r0, S1)
• hi = H(Oi−1, Si+1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
– Protocol:
• Si ⇒ Si+1: Π , {Ok | 0 ≤ k ≤ i} for 0 ≤ i ≤ n
The protocol is started by the originator S0 by picking a random value r0, com-
puting the hash value h0 and then constructing the “dummy” encapsulated offer
O0.
Thus, when the agent arrives at shop Si, it contains the set of previously
collected encapsulated offers including an encapsulated offer Oi−1 from which
the next hash value hi can be computed. In general, an encapsulated offer Oi
contains the offer oi probabilistically encrypted so that only S0 can retrieve
it. Moreover, it contains a hash of the previous offer Oi−1 concatenated to the
identity of the next shop Si+1. The reason of this is to link the previous offer with
the current offer, i.e., it should be impossible to modify Oi−1 without modifying
Oi as well. In fact, even shop Si−1 cannot modify its own offer later without
invalidating the chain consisting of the Oi. The reasons for including the identity
of the next shop is to guarantee that no one other shop than Si+1 can append
the next offer. The whole sequence of encapsulated offers is called a chaining
relation.
One of the most important goals is that a malicious shop Si must not be able
to modify already existing offers, i.e., Ok for k < i such that this tampering
remains unnoticed by the originator when the agent finally returns. This is called
strong forward integrity:
Strong Forward Integrity: None of the shops Si can modify any encapsulated
offers Ok for k < i such that the chain O0, O1 . . . , On is still “valid”, i.e.,
such that the originator cannot notice this tampering.
3.2 Formal Method Used
We now briefly describe the Dolev-Yao verification of the strong forward in-
tegrity property as performed in [29]. The verification follows Paulson’s induc-
tive approach [61], which represents a comprehensive Dolev-Yao-like algebra
along with suitable operations for the adversary. Roughly, this algebra augments
the algebra which we presented in Section 2.1 with certain cryptographic prim-
itives like abstractions of nonces, hash functions, and digital signatures. More-
over, message pairing is considered. The augmented rules for the adversary then
allow to create nonces, hashes and signatures. These rules are creating rules
(like Equation 2). Moreover, there are analyzing rules (like Equation 3), e.g., to
split a pair or to extract the message from an encryption given the corresponding
secret key.
Using this algebra, the protocol, i.e., the chaining relation can easily be ex-
pressed. The proof (of strong forward integrity) is then performed as a typical
Dolev-Yao proof, i.e., the set of all messages that the adversary can create and
analyze is computed and it is shown that none of these messages can be used to
mount a successful attack against the strong forward integrity property.
In the following section, we will describe an attack against the protocol,
which violates the strong forward integrity property. The attack is very simple
and does not rely on cryptanalysis.
3.3 Attack
In the following, we describe the attack from [66] against the protocol. Assume
that Si is a malicious shop. Then Si simply picks j at random from {1, . . . , i−1}
and a new Sj+1 of its choice. Note that there is no free choice for Sj once j is
fixed, only for Sj+1. The key idea of the attack is that Si uses its own mobile
agent ΠSi with its own program to collect offers from Sj . These offers are then
later plugged into the chain. Formally, Si collects an offer from the shop Sj as
follows:
Si → Sj : ΠSi , {O0, . . . , Oj−1}
Sj → Sj+1 : ΠSi , {O0, . . . , Oj}
Sj+1 → Si : ΠSi , {O0, . . . , Oj+1}
When the agent returns to Si, it throws away Oj+1, increments j, and picks a
new Sj+1. Note that Si can also repeatedly use different agents until a suitable
offer is received. Note further that the “anchor” O0 of the chaining relation is
signed with the secret key of S0. Hence the chaining relation and encapsulated
offers are build as if S0’s agent had requested the offer, but in reality they have
been requested by the malicious shop Si using its malicious agent ΠSi . If Si
is satisfied with the offers it has collected, it pastes them into S0’s agents and
sends it to Sj+1. In a nutshell, shops are abused as oracles for generating offers
to the terms of the malicious Si rather than the originator of the protocol S0.
3.4 Analysis
Why did the formal analysis fail to identify the attack? In [29], the achieved
result was perspicuously interpreted in the way that modifying or inserting an
offer while preserving the chaining relation requires modifying or inserting as
well all the following offers, which is made “a priori impossible by asking the
shops to sign their offers with their private keys”. The answer to the above ques-
tion also shows why this interpretation is flawed: The protocol does not pay at-
tention to a well-known robustness principle for secure protocol design: “Don’t
let yourself being used as an oracle for signing or decrypting messages” [6]. In
our case shops that have already given their offer can later be used as signing
oracles for signing messages by executing another protocol in parallel using an-
other agent. In a nutshell, another agent could be sent to the same shops, these
shops will propose new signed offers to this new agent, and these new offers
can then safely replace the corresponding offers in the original chaining rela-
tion without destroying it. In other words, the attack uses a capability which
was not modeled in this particular Dolev-Yao model. Note that this should not
be held against the proof in [29], since the author did a good job in explaining
and performing his work, but against the underlying model itself, which does
not comprise the full range of different attacks. We finally note that this attack
can surely be found in more suitable Dolev-Yao model if one adds an additional
suitable rule for the adversary. However, besides being more trustworthy than
hand-made proofs, this comes close to the wait-and-fix approach again.
3.5 Conclusion
We have illustrated why proofs based on Dolev-Yao-like models should be
treated with care. They do not imply provable security in the sense of absence
of any attacks, not even absence of simple non-cryptographic attacks. A Dolev-
Yao security analysis hence only models a certain set of attacks, which in our
case did not comprise the particular attack to which the protocol was vulnerable.
We can draw two main conclusions from this: The first is that Dolev-Yao-based
verifications do not yield proofs against every attacks. The second is that one
should start extending the expressiveness of Dolev-Yao-based models to come
closer to the “any attack” that is desirable from a cryptographic perspective.
4 A Cryptographer’s Wish list
In contrast to yielding proofs of security, we believe that such models are per-
fectly suited for detecting flaws, i.e., to increase confidence that a protocol is
secure. Moreover, experience shows that proofs done within the model also pro-
vide a significant insight in a protocol’s possible weaknesses. This also forces
the designers to really specify all details and a precise model of the requirements
that shall be satisfied. In order to increase the effectiveness of this process, we
present a wish list of adversary capabilities that we believe would be desirable
to capture in future Dolev-Yao-based extensions. The wish list is mainly moti-
vated by the cryptographic point of view. One should be able to design flawed
protocols that exploit exactly one of the vulnerabilities. Together with correct
protocols, these protocols can then be used to benchmark the detection rate of a
particular formal methodology.
4.1 Realistic Protocol Models
The first step towards better evaluations is to provide realistic modeling of a
protocol in the formalism used.
Open-ended Protocols So far, previous work has mostly concentrated on pro-
tocols with closed-ended data-structures, where messages exchanged between
principals have fixed and finite format. However, in many protocols, the data-
structures are open-ended, i.e., messages may consist of an a-priori unbounded
number of data fields that must be processed in one action. The question how to
formally deal with such protocols has been proposed by Meadows [53]. Some
results have already been achieved in this topic: The recursive authentication
protocol [32] has been subject to formal verification by both Paulson [60], us-
ing the theorem prover Isabelle, and by Bryans and Schneider [31], using the
PVS theorem prover. Meadows analyzed the protocol in [7] using the NRL ana-
lyzer. However, a comprehensive treatment is not yet well understood. Recently,
there are also results on decidability issues of the Dolev-Yao-like verification of
open-ended protocols [47].
Modeling of Advanced Protocol Assumptions Recently so-called pro-active
protocols [35, 43] have been developed which assume that some players may be
corrupted at some point in time and then re-initialize themselves and join the
honest crowd afterwards. Usually, the desired security requirement then relies
on the fact that at most a certain number of players are corrupted at any point in
time. To the best of our knowledge, this topic has not been addressed in a formal
analysis based on the Dolev-Yao model yet.
4.2 Controlling the Players
Once a protocol has been modeled, an analysis method defines the capabilities
of the adversary. In principle, the stronger the adversary, the more reliable the
analysis. The weakness that we have detected in Section 3 was caused by the
adversary model not reflecting the fact that real-life adversaries can send their
own agents.
Determine Whom You Trust for Each Requirement Cryptographic proto-
cols are usually specified by a list of requirements. For each requirement, the
authors either describe or assume a set of correct players. The set of correct
players can vary by requirement. E.g., for contract signing protocols it is com-
mon to assume that the contract verifier is unconditionally correct (otherwise
the verification is useless anyway) while the protocols aim at safeguards against
cheating notaries even though they are generally assumed to be correct. The
different trust assumptions have to be reflected in a Dolev-Yao model.
For evaluating protocols with a potentially unbounded number of partici-
pants, it is important that the adversary can determine the number and IDs of
participants. Common evaluations assume that, e.g., a two-party protocol in-
volves two parties and an adversary. This may prevent detection of attacks if the
adversary is unable to simulate additional protocol players by, e.g., generating
certified key sets and then using them in simulated protocol runs.
Adversary drives Participants The adversary should be allowed to largely
control the correct participants. This includes starting (sub-)protocols in any
order (generating keys, main protocol, recovery), generating keys, inputs, and
state-transitions behavior.
The adversary should be allowed to determine all inputs of the protocol.
This includes re-using earlier or interleaved protocol messages as an input to a
subsequent protocol run. If a protocol, e.g., sends a signed version signP (in) of
its input in, this protocol prefix can be used as a signing oracle. If the adversary
were not allowed to define the inputs, this oracle would not be accessible and
flaws might remain undetected. The adversary should also be able to determine
which player plays which role in a protocol. E.g., a player named “A” should be
able to first act as a contract signer and then as a notary.
Note that the fact that the adversary was unable to drive players using de-
rived inputs and create own agents caused the insecurity in the example in Sec-
tion 3 to go undetected. Otherwise, the adversary would have been able to re-
send a new agent and message.
Observing Protocol Runs and Players The capabilities of an adversary largely
depend on the network model. There are basically three orthogonal properties
of networks:
Authentic An adversary cannot send messages on behalf of other correct par-
ties.
Private The adversary does not obtain knowledge about the content of mes-
sages that are transmitted between correct parties.
Reliable The adversary cannot delete messages that are transmitted between
correct parties.
The subsets of these properties define a half-order of network models where the
model providing all those guarantees is the strongest. Furthermore, certain net-
work connections may only be available at certain times (e.g., a private network
for key exchange should disappear or be blocked after initialization). In a formal
analysis, one needs to be very careful to chose the right network model. If, for
example, the protocol assumes the weakest model while the evaluation models
a stronger one, the verification will succeed even though the protocol may fail
in practice.
For a formal analysis, the consequences are that an adversary can read any
non-privacy traffic, can pretend to have sent any non-authentic traffic (e.g., pre-
tending that a message was sent by a correct player A), and can delete any
non-reliable traffic.
4.3 Deriving Knowledge
Deriving new messages or knowledge from a given set of observations is the
strength of the Dolev-Yao model. It rigorously defines which messages the ad-
versary can analyze and create by means of derivation rules, based on the set of
observed messages.
One usually assumes that an adversary obtains a set of initial knowledge.
This can include type IDs and the identifiers and public keys of all participants.
Splitting and Re-Assembling Messages The first step is to split messages.
Splitting messages generally means decomposing tuples while learning their
atoms, detaching signatures while learning contents and signerID. It should in-
clude decomposing network transmissions to learn sender and recipientID. An-
other safeguard is to assume that the adversary learns the encrypterID and its
public key from a ciphertext.
From a cryptographic point of view, a suitable model should also include the
composition and decomposition of binary strings: If a part of a secret message
is included as a part of another binary string, this can clearly be a problem but
it will not be detected by most models.
The adversary should be able to re-compose tuples, typed data structures,
network messages, attach signatures for all non-correct parties (either initially
known or unknown), and encrypt messages with any known piece of data. Ex-
amples how this can be used is to re-type a message by first detaching the type
and then attaching another type (unless signed since a signature cannot be re-
attached).
Polynomial Computations In current Dolev-Yao-based models, the adversary
is not allowed to perform any arithmetic computation, e.g., compute a + b if a
and b are known. The reason is that this would enable the adversary to compute
the whole message space and then non-deterministically pick a message that
can be used to mount a successful attack. The solution could be to adopt the
cryptographic notion of a polynomially bounded adversary, i.e., to only con-
sider a polynomial number of transition while each transition can be computed
in polynomial time. Since this requires a concise treatment of polynomiality, the
incorporation of this topic in the Dolev-Yao model is still in its infancy. How-
ever, some important results already exist which point out that achieving this
goal is indeed feasible [49, 50].
Complicated Derivations Sometimes, it would also be desirable to have cer-
tain derivations rules for capturing possible number-theoretic capabilities also in
the abstract framework. For instance in RSA, it is well-known that an attack can
be successfully mounted provided that two ciphertexts stand in a known linear
relation. In formulas, if for a public key exponent e and an RSA modulus n two
encryptions
c1 = m
e mod n, c2 = (a ·m+ b)
e mod n
are given where a and b are known, then m can be computed in timeO(e log2 e).
Heather and Schneider tried in [42] to extend a Dolev-Yao-based attacker model
such that it captures this cryptographic attack. They have shown why achieving
this task is not easily possible, and they agreed with our opinion that more work
is needed on adapting the attacker capabilities to cover cryptographic attacks.
4.4 On Different Attacks
We now describe actual attacks that should be detectable. Note that by control-
ling the players, the adversary can start any number of parallel and interleaved
runs with any number of participants.
Looking for Violations of Common Robustness Principles Several work has
been devoted to propose robustness principles for improving the design qual-
ity of cryptographic protocols [6, 3, 30]. This is done by means of describing
design guidelines that should help to prevent common attacks. It is important
to note that none of these principles is necessary to obtain the desired security
requirements. Two of the most common principles are
– Name the Participants: The participant names of a protocol should be in-
cluded securely in each run. A violation of this principle was the reason
why the Needham-Schroeder Public Key protocol could be successfully at-
tacked.
– Prevent Oracles: Make sure that parts of a protocol run cannot be used as
oracles to sign or decrypt messages. Violating this principle was the reason
why the attack in Section 3 was successful.
A suitable tool should check if a protocol has a flaw that violates one of the most
common robustness principle. Moreover, it would even be helpful to detect if a
protocol violates a principles without checking if this violation gives rise to an
attack. The advantage is that detecting a violation is much simpler to achieve
in formal proof tools than mounting the actual attack, and the result will be
sufficient to point to a possible weak spot of the protocol. This weakness can
then further be investigated by the protocol designer.
Attacking Synchronous Protocols A synchronous protocol assumes a global
notion of rounds where all participants perform their state transitions simulta-
neously if they are intended to switch in the same round. Messages on reliable
channels are transmitted between two rounds. A simple adversary observes all
outputs and then creates inputs that are expected on unreliable channels.
However, the model may also allow for adversaries that messes with the
participants during a round. E.g., it may first switch participant P1, then using
the output of P1 as an input to switching P2 in the same round. I.e., the adversary
can interactively determine the switching sequence (within the same round) of
all correct machines while selecting the (unreliable) inputs for each.
5 Conclusion
We have challenged the ability of the Dolev-Yao model, the de facto standard
in verifying security protocols using tool support, to yield complete proof of
security. We have substantiated our provisos by means of a protocol which has
been formally verified in the Dolev-Yao model, but that has later fallen prey
to an uncovered attack. In contrast to yielding proofs of security, we believe
that the model is perfectly suited for detecting flaws, i.e., to increase confidence
that a protocol is secure. Moreover, experience shows that proofs done within
the model also provide a significant insight in a protocol’s possible weaknesses.
This also forces the designers to really specify all details and a precise model of
the requirements that shall be satisfied. In order to increase the effectiveness of
this process, we have concluded with a wish list of adversary capabilities that we
believe would be desirable to capture in future Dolev-Yao extensions. The wish
list is mainly motivated by the cryptographic point of view. It is surely not all-
embracing and already partially realized by existing Dolev-Yao-like approaches,
hence extensions of it are surely worth to be discussed.
We have challenged the ability of the Dolev-Yao model, the de facto stan-
dard in verifying security protocols using tool support, to yield complete proof
of security. We have substantiated our claim by means of a protocol which has
been formally verified in a Dolev-Yao-based model, but that has later fallen prey
to an uncovered attack.
We nevertheless believe that the model is useful for detecting flaws. More-
over, experience shows that proofs done within the model also provide a signif-
icant insight in a protocol’s possible weaknesses. This also forces the designers
to really specify all details and a precise model of the requirements that shall be
satisfied.
In order to increase the effectiveness of this process, we have initiated the
evolution of an “adversary capability catalog” that formalizes known attacks.
The larger this catalog will be the more attacks will be detected, and the higher
the security assurance of the resulting formal analysis will be.
In the future, one should be able to identify or design flawed protocols that
are vulnerable to exactly one of each adversary capabilities. Like the current
suite of flawed authentication protocols [36], these protocols can then be used
to benchmark the detection rate of a particular formal methodology.
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